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The following excerpt is significant on two definite counts. One, because it is true. Even (or especially) with the benefit of ample historical hind-sight. Second, because it sets apart the technique of science and indirectly pits it against the need for a sense of propriety, a sense of proportion, a sense of practicality rooted in an appropriate philosophy that is in turn anchored in a universally beneficial idealism. The knowledge that science confers, the temper that it inculcates are saved from the power that the technique of science confers. The last has led to unjustified destruction of reputation and respect of the former two.
The excerpt is drawn from the last three paragraphs of the chapter 'General Characteristics', Part I (From the Rennaisance to Hume), Book III (Modern Philosophy) in 'History of Western Philosophy' by Bertrand Russell (Routledge Classics edition).
"Modern philosophy, however, has retained, for the most part, an individualistic and subjective tendency. This is very marked in Descartes, who builds up all knowledge from the certainty of his own existence, and accepts clearness and distinctness (both subjective) as criteria of truth. It is not prominent in Spinoza, but reappears in Leibniz's windowless monads. Locke, whose temperament is thoroughly objective, is forced reluctantly into the subjective doctrine that knowledge is of the agreement or disagreement of ideas --- a view so repulsive to him that he escapes from it by violent inconsistencies. Berkley, after abolishing matter, is only saved from complete subjectivism by a use of God which most subsequent philosophers have regarded as illegitimate. In Hume, the empiricist philosophy culminated in a scepticism that none could refute and none could accept. Kant and Fichte were subjective in temperament as well as in doctrine; Hegel saved himself by means of the influence of Spinoza. Rousseau and the romantic movement extended subjectivity from theory of knowledge to ethics and politics, and ended, logically, in complete anarchism such as that of Bakunin. This extreme form of subjectivism is a form of madness.
Meanwhile science as a technique was building up in practical men a quite different outlook from any that was to be found among theoretical philosophers. Technique conferred a sense of power: man is now much less at the mercy of his environment than he was in former times. But the power conferred by technique is social, not individual; an average individual wrecked on a desert island could have achieved more in the seventeenth century than he could now [20th century]. Scientific technique requires the co-operation of a large number of individuals organized under a single direction. Its tendency, therefore, is against anarchism and even individualism, since it demands a well-knit social structure. Unlike religion, it is ethically neutral: it assures men that they can perform wonders, but does not tell them what wonders to perform. In this way it is incomplete. In pratice, the purposes to which scientific skill will be devoted depend largely on chance. The men at the head of the vast organizations which it necessitates can, within limits, turn it this way or that as they please. The power impulse thus has a scope which it never had before. The philosophies that have been inspired by scientific technique are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything non-human as mere raw material. Ends are no longer considered; only the skilfulness of the process is valued. This is also a form of madness. It is, in our day, the most dangerous form, and the one against which a sane philosophy should provide an antidote.
The ancient wolrd found an end to anarchy in the Roman Empire, but the Roman Empire was a brute fact, not an idea. The Catholic world sought an end to anarchy in the Church, which was an idea, but was never adequately embodied in fact. Neither the ancient nor the medieval solution was satisfactory --- the one because it could not be idealized, the other because it could not be actualized. The modern world, at present, seems to be moving towards a solution like that of antiquity: a social order imposed by force, representing the will of the powerful rather than the hopes of the common men. The problem of a durable and satisfactory social order can only be solved by combining the solidity of the Roman Empire with the idealism of St. Augustine's City of God. To achieve this a new philosophy will be needed."
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